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The once-again rapidly expanding numbers of immigrants in the American labor market has not escaped the attention of labor economists. In this paper, I deal with two issues concerning immigrants on which labor economists have made significant contributions over the last few decades. The first question concerns what has happened to the skill gap between immigrants and Native-born Americans (see Borjas (1995) and ). This 'what happened' question is followed by 'why did it happen' and I will offer my answers to why. The second question concerns what has happened to the education dimension of the skill gap for descendants of immigrants-assimilation across generations.
An important form in which this question has been asked is how the recent waves of ethnic immigrants compare with the reality of the generational success of European immigrant experience, a success that has shaped much of mythology surrounding the American immigrant experience.
Section 1-The Changing Labor Market Quality of Immigrants
Immigrants may not come with much, but they do bring their human capital. Schooling is the most basic index of skill and how much education migrants had when they arrived may be critical in determining their eventual economic success or failure. Immigrants are generally thought to have much less schooling than Native-born Americans do-a disparity that it is often claimed has been growing over These opposing trends are not a contradiction. The stock of migrants is weighted heavily by the history of the volume and character of past migration flows. The negative age gradient to mean schooling combined with a much older immigrant population than the native-born population due to the long historical stall in migration to the United States before 1960 implies that as some of the older immigrants (many of whom had very little schooling) die off, the mean education of those remaining will rise. This is especially the case when the pace of migration quickens thereby placing higher weight on younger more educated migrants. It is not at all clear why the stock concept is not the more relevant statistic to describe what is happening to the average migrant and native-born person over time. Nor is it even clear why measures of flows only count new entrant inflows while ignoring new exit outflows-older migrants who die off.
Another outflow that may also be quite important but one that is ignored in the concentration on 'recent' immigrants is those recent immigrants from any entering cohort who returned home either permanently or temporarily to the sending countries. It is difficult to gauge the precise magnitude of this effect since other forces are also operating here as well, including continuing schooling advances among recent migrants and the general tendency of education inflation that characterizes even closed cohorts in Census and CPS data over time. However, it is most likely that the migrant outflow is less educated than those who remained in the US. One reason is that the outflow is undoubtedly more concentrated in that years of schooling in each survey, see the data Appendix.
subset of recent migrants who are undocumented, a less-education group of migrants engaged in more temporary or circular migration.
Thus, even if we ignore the stock-flow distinction, the common use of data on 'recent' immigrants overstates the extent of the labor market quality differences between immigrants and the native-born. However, the existing literature has in fact emphasized cohort inflows and I will follow that practice in this paper as well. Perhaps more to the point, no matter whether one uses the stock or inflow of recent migrants, these changes in the education gap may appear small relative to the attention this issue receives in the literature. For example, even if we use only recent migrant inflow as the reference group, the endpoint-to-end-point deterioration in the migrant schooling gap was only about a year of schooling.
One question is whether these overall trends are the same for male and female immigrants. To examine this issue, Figure 2 presents data for trends in the schooling gap for male migrants while Figure 3 plots similar data on education deficits of female migrants. The direction of trends in the stocks is quite similar for men and women with a narrowing of the migrant schooling gap compared with the native-2 The same argument implies that ignoring this outflow overstates the amount of labor market wage assimilation that takes place within an entering cohort as duration of stay increases. This should be especially true for Latino and born. In contrast, among recent migrant inflows, while the slowly expanding education deficit with the native-born characterizes both men and women, the education gap increases at a slower rate among women than among men. In fact, among recent female migrant inflows, the education gap is actually If all we knew were these trends in schooling differences by nativity, the expanding skill gap of migrants would be less of a concern.
3 But the main evidence in favor of a growing skill gap comes from wages not schooling. To see this, Figure 4 plots trends in the percent wage gap between recent male migrants and male native-born workers among men between the ages of 25 and 54 years old. 4 Starting at about an 18% wage gap in 1970, the average migrant wage gap grew steadily larger reaching a peak at 30% in 1996. While there apparently has been some recovery in recent years, it remains the case that a story of declining relative skills of new migrants appears to have considerable support from wage data.
However, in addition to any effect changing labor market quality of immigrants may have had on observed labor market outcomes, there are three other forces that should be examined first to assess their impact on the expanding wage gap of recent immigrants. These three forces are age, prices, and illegal Mexican immigrants. 3 An important caveat to that statement is that my description of the schooling gap is limited to mean differences only. Differences in schooling distributions between recent immigrants and the native-born are much bigger than the mean difference alone would imply. For example, consider the one-year difference is mean schooling between recent immigrants and the native-born in Figure 1 in calendar year 2002. That relatively small difference in means camouflages large counteracting differences in the tails of the distribution. To illustrate, 27% of recent immigrants did not graduate from high school compared to 12% of the native born while 14% of recent immigrants had more than a college degree compared to 10% of the native-born. The relatively small difference in means in that year is certainly not to imply that the large differences in the bottom tail are of little consequence and should be ignored. I will argue below that the large difference in the lower tail is largely due to undocumented migrants while the large difference in the upper tail of the schooling distribution is due to legal migrants. 4 As is usually the case, the focus turns to men only when wages and labor market data are used. Bringing in women raises many complicating issues about labor force participation and the selectivity of the wages based on labor force participants only. Income is defined as wage and salary income. Percent wage differentials are computed as the natural lns of the ratio of the arithmetic means of recent immigrants compared to the native-born. All male recent immigrants are compared to all male native-born, both between the ages of 25-54 years old. See the data appendix for details on the construction of weekly wages.
immigration. 5 I will deal with each one of them in isolation to determine how much of the trend in the recent immigrant wage gap each can explain.
The first of the three forces is age. Over the last 60 years, Figure 5 .a documents there have been large changes in the age disparity between immigrants and the native-born. In 1940 the average migrant were actually older than the typical native-born American-today they are much younger. This chart
shows that for all migrants as well as for recent migrants there has taken place a steady widening of the age gap between the native-born and foreign-born-for example over the full span of years represented in this chart this age gap for recent migrants has expanded by more than six years.
Two distinct demographic forces have acted to expand the age gap between migrants and the native-born over the last fifty years. First as the pace of immigration quickens, the average migrant necessarily becomes younger. Second, the aging of the baby boom cohorts has made the typical nativeborn in the workforce older. Given the well-established curvature in age earnings profiles, this growing age gap by nativity affects the observed average wage gap of immigrants. While one could argue that age is simply another dimension of skill, I think that an increasing immigrant wage gap simply due to fact that American workers are getting older or immigrants younger is not what we should mean by an expanding skill gap of immigrants.
To age adjust the time series wage gap between recent migrants and the native-born, for men between the ages of 25 and 54 I estimated separately for the Native-born and for recent immigrants a series of year specific standard Mincerian ln weekly wage equations with years of schooling and an age quadratic as controls. In the recent immigrant models, ethnic dummies for European, Asian, and Latino ancestry were also included. Using the estimated quadratic age profiles, the ln weekly wages of both the 5 One issue that has received considerable attention in the recent literature on the racial wage gap concerns the importance of the exclusion of the institutionalized population from the CPS files. For the age groups I am analyzing the incarcerated population comprises most of those who are institutionalized. However, this is most likely to be a far less serious issue among immigrants. For example, among male prison inmates between the ages of 18 and 54 years old in 1991, 5.4 % were non-citizens compared to their about 7% representation in this subgroup of the population (see Table 8 . 6 Smith and Edmonston, 1997) . In a similar vein, using the 1980 and 1990 Censuses, Butcher and Piehl (1997 report that immigrants are much less likely to be institutionalized than the native-born are. Their table 2 reports for example that in 1990 rates of institutionalization for men ages 18-40 were 1.5% for native born and recent migrants were then adjusted in each year represented in Figure 5 .b so that the ln wages of both groups would be evaluated at the same age. The age I chose was thirty-eight since it is close to the age of the current average male native-born worker. These age adjusted ln wages are the data used in Figure 5 .b.
The results of this age adjustment on the recent migrant wage gap are displayed in Figure 5 . While age is one factor leading to an increasing migrant wage gap, it is certainly not the only one.
Another concerns the effect of changing prices. Wages are the product of prices and skills and we should always be wary of assigning all observed wage trends to skills. This is particularly the case over the last thirty years and especially so in this application where labor economists have convincingly established that skill prices have changed a great deal over the period in question (Katz and Welch 1992) . When two populations start off at very different initial conditions in terms of their relative placement of their real wage distributions, this type of changing wage structure can have quite large impacts on the subsequent repositioning of the relative placement of different groups in the wage immigrants, 2.2% for the native-born and 8.1% for native-born Blacks. 6 Borjas (1995) also does an age adjustment for wage trends for recent immigrants and finds little effect. But as Figure 5 .a shows this is the time period when the trends in differences in ages between the native-born and recent immigrants are quite small.
distributions (Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce, 1993) . 7 These wage inequality adjustments were done for men between the ages of 25 and 54 years old. Using 1970 as the base year, the first step involved computing at each percentile of the native-born male weekly wage distribution the ratio of real weekly wages in each subsequent year relative to the same wage percentile in 1970. In the second step, in each year percentiles in the weekly wage distributions of recent foreign-born immigrants were matched to percentiles of weekly wages of native-born men so that at each percentile weekly wages were the same for both groups. The comparable native-born wage percentile wage growth tells us what would have happened to immigrant real weekly wage at ever wage percentile if recent immigrants were treated the same as the native-born in terms of real wage growth as a consequence of a rising skill price. Mean wages of this hypothetical weekly wage distribution of recent immigrants was used to adjust the data to obtain the wage inequality adjusted wage gaps in Figure 7 . 8 Similar conclusions were reached by LaLonde and Topel (1992) and Butcher and DiNardo (2002) . Using only the 1970 and 1980 decennial Censuses, LaLonde and Topel adapt a similar analytical strategy to that used in this paper. They report that for low skilled immigrant groups-those with 10 years of schooling or less or Mexican immigrants-rising inequality did 'affect the relative wages of immigrants in some cases by a substantial amount.' Similarly, using constructed hourly wage data from the 1970 and 1990 decennial Censuses, Butcher and DiNardo apply the 1990 price structure to the 1970 data. They report that there was substantial overlap in the two wage distributions of recent immigrants when they faced the same prices. More specifically, they state that at the mean for men, 50% of the change between 1970 and 1990 is due to changing wage structure, a number quite consistent with the data presented in Figure 7 . For a contrary view, Borjas (1995) reports that only one-sixth of the change
The final factor I consider involves the impact of illegal immigration. Labor economists have been mostly silent on the distinction between legal and illegal migrant flows in part because our main data sets used in analyses-the CPS and Census-are unable to distinguish between them.
But legal and illegal migrants turn out to represent very different populations. One way that they differ is documented in Table 1 Asian and European migrants are in fact legal and the majority of recent Latino migrants are not. Given the well-established labor market skill differences between these groups, country of origin differences alone would imply large differences in skills and wages between legal and illegal migrants.
To show how big those differences are, I use data from two sources. The first is the New Immigrant Survey-Pilot (NIS-P), a nationally representative sample of new legal migrants who received their green cards in 1996. Based on probability samples of administrative records of the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the NIS-P links survey information about immigrants' preand post-immigration labor market, schooling, and migratory experiences with data available from INS administrative records including the visa type under which the immigrant was admitted (see Jasso,
Massey, Rosenzweig, and Smith (2000) for details). The second is the 1996 CPS, which represents all recent migrants (legal and illegal alike). With these two surveys from the same calendar year, we are able to describe three distinct populations-all recent migrants from the CPS; legal migrants only from the NIS-P; and the residual group-the difference between them, recent undocumented migrants. Two parameters provide the answer to this question-levels and changes in levels in both the fraction of migrants who are undocumented and the wage gap between legal and undocumented migrants.
What do we reasonably know about these two parameters?
Fortunately we know much more than we used to know about them. Consider first the wage difference between legal and illegal migrants. The enormous differences in ethnicity and in education between these two populations documented in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that undocumented migrants earn much less than legal migrants do. For example, the two and a year difference in mean education between illegals and legals with an eight percent return to schooling would by itself imply that wages of illegals would be twenty percent less than legals. Similarly, if legals and illegals within the same ethnic group but on a temporary visa. However, the dominant group in the residual category is the undocumented.
were paid the same, the differences in ethnic distributions would indicate that illegals would earn 70% of the wages of legal migrants. These two hypotheticals both understate the actual wage disparity since even within the same education class or ethnic group undocumented migrants surely earn significantly less than their legal counterparts.
Additional evidence is provided in Table 3 , which shows earnings in the home country as well as in the United States for a random sample of legal migrants who came in 1996. These migrants are separated into those with prior illegal experience and those without any prior illegal experience in the US.
The wage disparity between these two groups is quite large. In their jobs in the United States, in this sample undocumented migrants earned 74% as much as legal migrants. Once again this wage disparity is most likely an understatement of the wage gap between all recent legal and illegal migrants. While these legal immigrants may be representative of all recent legal recent migrants, the undocumented migrants in this sample are quite unique in that they eventually made the transition to legal status, a process that favors the more skilled. Those undocumented migrants who never transited to legal status (the majority) most likely earned less than those who successfully made that transition.
For the purpose of the simulation of the impact of illegal migrants on wage trends on migrants, I
will use the assumption that undocumented migrants earn 60% what legal migrants do. Moreover, I will also assume that this wage ratio has not changed over time making the second term in equation 1 equal to zero. This assumption will understate the extent to which the wages of legal and illegal migrants grew apart over the last thirty years since it is far more likely that the wage disparity between legals and illegals grew in light of the pro-skill bias in changes in the legal immigration policy ).
What about the other parameter-the changing fraction of migrants who are undocumented?
Over the last 30 years, there has taken place a quite dramatic increase in the fraction of new immigrants who are illegal. Using data from Passel and his associates (Passel (1999), and Passel et al. (2004) ), Given the magnitude of this trend in rising fractions of undocumented migrants, Figure 8 provides an estimate of what has been happening to the wage gap of legal migrants only. This is a very different type of story than that observed for all recent immigrants. Instead of an expanding immigrant wage gap, the last thirty years the wage gap of new legal migrants has been becoming smaller. This should not be surprising since the main revisions to immigration law governing legal immigrants during the last few decades have had a strong pro skill bias (see for details). Similarly, using INS data on new legal migrants alone Jasso, Rosenzweig, and demonstrate that wages of legal immigrants have been rising relative to those of native-born Americans.
The education gap between migrants and the native-born can also be adjusted for the changing fraction of migrants who are illegal. To do so, education of legal migrants is obtained from the 1996 New Immigrant Survey Pilot Survey. Assuming that the education gap between undocumented and legal migrants has remained constant over time (a conservative assumption for this purpose), Figure 9 describes trends in the education gap between legal immigrants and native-born Americans. Instead of an increasing gap, there apparently is no trend at all. Since the schooling gap between legal and illegal was almost certainly growing over this period, it is most likely that there was a small widening of the education gap with native-born Americans, but one that tilts in favor of legal immigrants.
What can be concluded from all this? First the evidence in favor of a widening skill gap between immigrants and the native born may not be as strong as many of us including this author used to think (Smith and Edmonston, 1997) . While wage data show a pronounced fall in the relative wages of recent immigrants, significant independent contributors to that decline are due to a widening age gap or the increasing price of skill.
Moreover, when our attention shifts to legal migrants the evidence seems if anything the reverse.
Legal migrants appear on average to be as least as skilled as the average American worker, and they are at a minimum keeping up with native-born Americans. The distinction between trends for legal and undocumented migrants is important since the policies that produce the flows are quite different.
Explanations for the declining labor market quality of immigrants have often focused on ethnicity (the increasing numbers of Hispanics) and see it as a consequence of changes in legal immigration laws. This analysis argues instead that any decline largely reflects the increasing numbers of undocumented migrants who are largely Latinos. Getting this straight is important not only for understanding our migration history, but also for not confusing the policy response. For example, if this analysis is correct reducing the flows of legal immigrants due to a concern about the declining relative labor market quality of immigrants could have the opposite effect. This is both because we have restricted the more skilled component of immigration, but also likely encouraged additional undocumented migration (the less skilled component). 
Immigrant Education and Generational Assimilation
Successful economic mobility across immigrant generations was a deeply held belief about American immigration history. However, the actual documentation of the speed at which different immigrant ethnic groups were able to secure a better economic lot for their heirs is under renewed debate.
11 The conventional and current view is that in terms of generational assimilation the waves of European immigrants who arrived at the end of the 19 th century and the beginning of the 20 th century
were an enormous success. Some of the progeny of these European immigrants have become CEOs of major corporations, professors at the leading American Universities, and Presidents of the United States.
The success of more recent waves of immigrants, which were dominated by Asian and especially 10 See Jasso, Rosenzweig, and for details about this type of substitution. 11 Some intriguing recent work by labor economists has focused on the 'intergenerational assimilation rate',-one minus the coefficient estimated from a regression of children on parents' schooling see (Card et al 2000) or Borjas 1994 for some good examples. These issues are important, but even if the estimated education coefficients were the same for all ethnic immigrant groups, one group could have larger education gains across generations through the constant term.
Latino immigrants, is often seen as more problematic (Glazer and Moynihan, 1963) , Bean et al, 1994) . Trejo (1997) ). This concern is particularly strong with Latino immigrants where the existing demographic and economic literature adopts a quite pessimistic tone about the extent of generational progress within the Hispanic population (Huntington 2004) . In this section, I will document the differential ability of European, Asian, and Hispanic immigrants to secure a better economic lot for their children and grandchildren. In an earlier paper, I presented some generational progress for Hispanic men (Smith, 2003) . This methodology is extended here to the other two main immigrant groups-Europeans and Asians and, for all three ethnic groups, data are also presented for women.
One problem in studying generational assimilation concerns the ambiguity in defining generations and ethnicity across different Census and CPS files. In this research, generations are defined as follows: 1 st generation-born outside the U.S.; 2 nd generation-at least one parent born outside the U.S.; 3 rd generation or more-both parents born in the U.S. Thus, when reference is made to the 3 rd generation, due to the form in which the data come it actually includes all generations beyond the second.
Due to conceptual and data reasons, defining ethnicity is more difficult. For example, there were two ways that someone was identified as Asian. The first method used the race question regularly asked in the Census and the CPS and counted all those who self-identified as Asian in response to that question.
I then defined the specific Asian generation by place of birth-if foreign-born they were first generation Asian, if one parent was foreign-born they were second generation Asian, and if neither parents nor the respondent was foreign-born they were counted as third generation Asian. Alternatively, for the first and second generation only, I used a specific list of Asian countries of birth to assign Asian ancestry.
Fortunately, the overlap between these two methods was very large. For example, using the 1996 CPS, 94% of the foreign-born who said that they were of Asian race were also born in the list of Asian countries used and 90% of those who were born in the selected Asian countries also said that their race was Asian. The analyses reported here were simultaneously conducted for both the race and country definitions of Asian and none of the conclusions were affected. In the tables below, I use country of birth to define the first two Asian generations. Finally, when the race question was used to categorize, Europe was the residual category. That is, one was of European ancestry if one did not claim being Hispanic, Asian, Black, or Native-American.
The generations were then assigned with the same algorithm used for Asians. Alternatively, a specific list of countries of birth of a respondent or his/her parents were used to say that one was a first or second generation European. By necessity, third generation Europeans always had to be defined using the residual race method, but this is not much of an issue given immigration history to the United States.
Once again the overlap in the two methods were quite high-95% of those from the country list were also defined as Europeans using the residual race method and 85% of those on the residual race method had a country of birth on the European list. Once again, the substantive conclusions of this paper did not depend 12 Once again, there is little practical difference between these two methods. For example, the 1980 Census contains both self-identification and country of birth questions and the correspondence between these two methods is extremely high. For example, in 1980, 97 percent of those born abroad who self identified as Hispanics were born in the list of countries I used to identify Hispanic immigrants. Once again, in this section, the list of countries was used to define 1 st and 2 nd generation Latinos.
on which method of assigning ethnicity was used for Europeans. 14 The country list is used in tables that follow for the 1 st and 2 nd generation.
No matter which procedure is used, constructing this generational data requires that information on country of birth exists for both respondents and their parents and that some method is available for identifying ethnicity. It is the alleged inability of successive Hispanic generations to close their schooling gap that led to pessimism about generational assimilation. To illustrate where that pessimism comes from, Table 5 documents the pattern of education accomplishments by immigrant generation that one would obtain from a typical cross-sectional survey, in this case the 1996 Current Population survey. The first two panels list education levels for three generations of Hispanics, the next two panels the corresponding information for those of European descent, while the last two panels contain the generational schooling data for Asians.
For each of these three ethnic categories, mean education by generation is first presented for men followed by a parallel set of generational data for women. Any other CPS or Census year would show basically similar patterns by generation to those displayed in Table 5 .
If one considers only the cross-sectional schooling levels by generation for Latino men and women, one can see the origins for the pessimism about the alleged inability of successive Hispanic 14 Since there was no way of excluding them from the third plus generations, Canadians were included in the list of European countries for the first two generations. Excluding Canadians had little effect on the results.
generations to close their schooling gap. For both men and women, Latino education levels do rise by almost three years between the 1 st and 2 nd generation, but in every age group listed the mean education of the third generation is actually less than that of the second. Moreover, across all three generations, Latino schooling gains among men were only about two and one half years and for Hispanic women only 2.1 years of schooling. Since these generations span at least 50 years, at this pace generation progress could rightly be labeled slow, especially given beliefs about the considerable progress made by the children and grandchildren of the European immigrants and the common perceptions about the educational accomplishments of Asian migrants.
Cross-sectional data such as that contained in Table 5 have been repeatedly used to evaluate generational assimilation among Hispanics. Of course, data arrayed as in Table 5 are methodologically inappropriate and have little to do with generational assimilation. The easiest way of seeing this is to examine the patterns among Europeans, the gold standard of generational success among American immigrant groups.
Not surprisingly, Table 5 confirms the well-established fact that mean education of contemporary male and female European immigrants are far in excess of those of recent Hispanic immigrants. For men (women), the typical European immigrant had about four years (three and one half) more schooling than the average Latino immigrant. However, for our purposes, the key patterns in Table 5 concern the implied generational increases in education among Europeans. If we judged only by these cross-sectional patterns as the educational history of Hispanics is often assessed, the generational story for Europeans would actually be more pessimistic than it is for Latinos. To illustrate, the total mean schooling increase across all three generations in Table 5 is less than a year and for European men (the supposed comparative immigrant success story) and less than half a year among European women.
The story for Asians is if anything more dramatic. While mean schooling among contemporary migrants is even higher than for the Europeans, average education increases by only one-twentieth of a year between the first and third generation Asian men. If cross-sectional education levels by generation had any validity as a measure of generational progress, ironically it is Latino immigrants who would be judged as faring the best. But what the European and Asian data are telling us is that there is something seriously wrong with using data arrayed in this way to draw any conclusions about generational assimilation.
These data do not speak to inter-generation assimilation since we should not be comparing 2 nd and 3 rd generation workers of the same age in the same year. For example, the 40-year-old, 3 rd generation Asians in Table 5 are not sons of 40-year-old 2 nd generation Asian men in the same year, and certainly not the grandsons of the 1 st generation immigrants who were 40 years old in the same year. To correctly evaluate generational assimilation, the data must be realigned to match up the children and grandchildren of the each set of ethnic immigrants.
To obtain a single estimate for each five-year birth cohort cell, mean education by birth cohort and generation across all Census and groups of CPS years were averaged (that is the 1994-1997 CPSs form one group and the 1999-2002 CPSs another group). To track generation progress, the data in Tables   6 through 9 To the extent that schooling is an adequate proxy for labor market quality, reading down the column for the first generation is another way of monitoring secular changes in the 'quality' of immigrants. Among both Asian and European immigrants, there is a steady improvement over time in the average education of immigrants. The rate of improvement seems somewhat higher among Asians compared to Europeans and slightly higher among women compared to men. While there exists secular increases in schooling amongst Latino immigrants as well, these increases are definitely smaller than those of either European or Asian migrants (for either sex), a disadvantage that is larger among more recent birth cohorts of migrants.
Reading across any of the rows in Tables 6-9 documents the extent of education advances made by the descendents of immigrants. 15 This index of education generation progress are much higher and far more plausible than those implied by the cross-sectional comparison in Table 5 . To take the [1905] [1906] [1907] [1908] [1909] immigrant birth cohorts as an illustrative example, the increase in mean years of schooling across three generations was 4.6 years for European men and 6.6 years for Asian men. For the same birth cohort, the comparable male education advances was 7.5 years among all Hispanic men and 8. However, whether measured across all three or just two generations and for men and women alike, the education advances made by Latinos are actually greater than those achieved by either Europeans or Asian migrants. There is certainly no evidence from these data that Latinos have lagged behind these other large immigrant groups in their ability to transmit education accomplishments to their children and grandchildren.
16 15 Since these are blended means across as many as five surveys, the underlying sample sizes tend can be quite large. Consider the critical cohorts where all three generations are present. For example, among European men the smallest first generation sample size is 3,700 and the largest is over 10,000. Sample sizes are even larger in the second and third generation. For Hispanic males across the same cohorts, first generation sample sizes are as low as 181 and has high as 1,026. Once again sample sizes are larger for the second and third generations. Sample sizes are lowest for Asian immigrants, ranging from about 100 to about 500 for these cohorts. Given the regularity of the patterns in these tables, these sample sizes appear to be more than sufficient. 16 The interesting debate between Borjas (1994) and Alba et al (2001) uses literacy as a first generation measure and education as the third generation measure. They estimate a regression between group literacy rates in 1910 and third generation mean education in 1986-1994. Using this metric, they both suggest that intergenerational progress was This stronger educational transmission among Latinos between the 1 st and 2 nd generation should not be surprising since these Latino immigrants who have relatively low levels of schooling are sending their children to American schools where the norm is the completion of high school. When comparably educated European immigrants sent their children to American schools many decades earlier, the education completion norms at that time were not as high.
However, even when I examine the education transmission between the 2 nd (children of immigrants) and 3 rd generation (grandchildren of immigrants), the size of transmission at a minimum does not indicate that Latinos lag behind other immigrant groups. For two reasons, these data tend to understate the progress made by Latinos relative to other groups and to overstate the differences in educational accomplishments that remain in the third generation. As mentioned earlier, by necessity the third generation refers to all generations beyond the second. This tends to understate the relative educational advances of Latino immigrants between the second and third generation since a larger fraction of Latinos in the third plus group (compared to Europeans) will actually be members of the third generation. In contrast, many of the Europeans will be members of generations well beyond the third and unless all generational progress stops at the third generation, this will further increase their education levels.
The second reason why the educational advances of Latinos are understated at least relative to Europeans is that as Latinos intermarry and assimilate across the generations, some subset of them will w stop reporting their Latino ancestry. There is some evidence that this leakage out of Latino ancestry is positively correlated with education so that the gains in education across generations are biased downwards (Duncan and Trejo, 2005) This more positive reading of the history of Latino immigrant education advances across generations has some cautions attached to it. First some care has to be exercised in assessing rates of find that the concern that educational generational progress among Latino immigrants has lagged behind other immigrant groups is largely unfounded.
higher among Mexicans one would observe lower education levels of the third generation with low literacy rates.
Data Appendix
In this data appendix, I describe how the principal variables in this paper were defined in the various data sets that were used.
Years of Schooling
1940 Census: Years of schooling was defined by the highest grade of school completed and the value of five years or more of college was assigned a value of 17.5.
1950 Census: Years of schooling was defined by the highest grade attended from which one year was subtracted if the respondent was still attending school. Five years or more of college was assigned 17.5. This value as well as the one used in the 1940 Census was obtained by examining the distribution of schooling beyond college in the 1960 Census.
1960 and 1970 Censuses: Years of schooling was defined by the highest grade attended from which one year was subtracted if the respondent was still attending school. Six or more years of college was defined as 18.5.
1980 Census: Years of schooling was defined by the highest grade attended from which one year was subtracted if the respondent was still attending school. eight or more years of college was assigned the value 20.5. A number of additional sample restrictions were imposed. I excluded men (1) who worked less than 50 weeks in the previous year and who were now attending school; (2) who were in the military; (3) who were self-employed or working without pay if they were not employed in agriculture; (4) whose weekly wages put them below the following values: 1970 = $10. 00, 1980 = $19.80, 1990 = $33.82 1995,1996,1997,2000,2001 The Census and CPS all contain open-ended upper income intervals. The means of these top codes were calculated assuming that the upper part of the income distribution followed an exponential distribution and the following values were assigned; 1940 (5,000) = 8,900; 1950 (10,000) = 22,500; 1960 (25,000) = 42,500; 1970 (50,000)= 80,000; 1980 (75,000) = 115,000, 1990 (140,000) = 195,000. The CPS imputed top codes were used in that data. In the 2000 Census, respondents with wage and salary income equal to 175,000 and above were assigned the state mean for their state of residence based on all people in that state with wage and salary income equal to 175,000 and above.
Weeks worked were coded into broad intervals in the 1960 and 1970 Censuses. The following within interval means, derived from the 1980 Census, were assigned-1-13 = 6.5; 14-26 = 21.73, 27-29 =33.08; 40-47 = 42.67; 48-49 = 48.29; 50-52 =51.82 . In the other Census, years we used these intervals or the continuous value of weeks worked and the results were basically identical. In light of this, I used the continuous weeks measure in the CPS files. Percent weekly wage differentials are then computed as the difference in the natural lns of the ratio of the arithmetic means of recent immigrants compared to the native-born. All male recent immigrants are compared to all male native-born, both between the ages of 25-54 years old. Source: Jeff Passel. 
